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INTRODUCTION1 
 
Targeted sanctions remain an indispensable tool of the United Nations in maintaining 
international peace and security. With the objective of changing behavior, constraining 
proscribed activities, or signaling/stigmatizing targets in support of international norms, UN 
targeted sanctions are increasingly utilized by the international community to address a broad 
range of international threats.2   
 
In the 2009 “Watson Report,” we recommended reforms to ensure the UN system of sanctions 
designations be made more fair and transparent, in particular arguing for the establishment of a 
review mechanism at the UN level to address the legal and political challenges to targeted 
sanctions.  In the three years since the last Watson Report, significant reforms have transformed 
the Al Qaida sanctions (“1267 Committee”) regime.3  The Security Council’s establishment of 
the Office of the Ombudsperson and subsequent appointment of Judge Kimberly Prost – with her 
notable record of completing 22 cases resulting in the delisting of 19 individuals and 24 entities -
- constitutes an unprecedented step by the Council to create an effective process at the UN level 
whereby individuals may challenge for their removal from the 1267 list.      
 
Even with these important reforms, criticism of the regime and the general perception of 
unfairness in the application of UN targeted sanctions persist, generating opposition and concern, 
especially from human rights advocates and national and regional courts.  The Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms'while 
countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson, (“Special Rapporteur”) concluded in his report to the 
General Assembly on 2 November, that the Ombudsperson’s mandate fell short of international 
minimum standards of due process and urged the Council to bring the Al-Qaida sanctions regime 
into conformity with international human rights norms.4  He called on the Council to strengthen 
the Ombudsperson by making her recommendations binding and public, and by extending the 
length of her mandate. Emmerson also recommended that the Security Council reconsider a 
sunset clause that would impose time limits on the duration of all designations.  The group of 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
1 The report builds upon and updates previous Watson reports in 2006 and 2009, and is intended to be read in 
conjunction with them.  See Strengthening Targeted Sanctions Through Fair and Clear Procedures, March 2006, at: 
http://watsoninstitute.org/pub/Strengthening_Targeted_Sanctions.pdf and Addressing Challenges to Targeted 
Sanctions An Update of the “Watson Report,” October 2009, at: 
http://www.watsoninstitute.org/pub/2009_10_targeted_sanctions.pdf 
2 This typology of multiple purposes of UN sanctions is discussed in Designing United Nations Targeted Sanctions: 
Initial Findings of the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (TSC) Evaluating Impacts and Effectiveness of UN Targeted 
Sanctions, August 2012, at: 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/internationalgovernance/shared/PSIG_images/Sanctions/Designing%20UN%
20Targeted%20Sanctions.pdf 
3 The United Nation’s Al Qaida Sanctions Committee, established pursuant to UNSCR 1267 (referred to as the 
“1267 Committee”) originally included both Al Qaida (and associated individuals/entities) and the Taliban, but the 
regime was split in June 2011, after which UNSCR 1989 applied to Al Qaida and UNSCR 1988 sanctioned the 
Taliban. See http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/. 
4 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism, A/67/396 (“Special Rapporteur report”), 26 September 2012, at: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N12/522/54/PDF/N1252254.pdf?OpenElement.  See also UN press release'
GA/SHC/4049 on the SR presentation to the General Assembly on 2 November 2012 at: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/gashc4049.doc.htm'
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“like minded states”5 has also suggested additional reforms of the Ombudsperson system.  The 
Security Council will consider the Ombudsperson’s mandate and decide whether to extend it by 
the end of 2012.  
 
It is useful to recall the context within which this unique Ombudsperson mechanism functions. 
Targeted sanctions are political measures imposed by a political body, the United Nations 
Security Council.  They are preventative measures, rather than punitive ones, intended to address 
threats to international peace and security – in the case of the 1267 committee, international 
terrorism. Decisions to list individuals or entities are not legal determinations per se, but rather 
political findings of association with Al Qaeda. Designations are intended to be temporary, at 
least in theory. As such, they do not require the same evidentiary standards associated with 
criminal prosecutions. Nonetheless, the open-ended nature of UN sanctions have had serious 
punitive effects on those designated, leading courts to find violations of due process. 
 
The pace of litigation has slowed and the number of cases related to 1267 has diminished.  At the 
time of the 2009 Watson report, more than thirty legal challenges to UN Security Council 
targeted sanctions listings had been pursued in courts worldwide regarding designations made 
either by the UN’s 1267 Committee or in the context of the implementation of UNSCR 1373. 
Many cases were dropped after individuals were delisted by the 1267 Committee, but several are 
pending or remain under appeal.   
 
The most consequential challenge currently pending is the appeal of the 2010 judgment of the 
General Court (formerly the Court of First Instance) in the Kadi case.6 Judgment was rendered 
prior to the enhancement of Ombudsperson’s authorities, so the case (expected early in 2013) 
presents the opportunity for the European Court of Justice to rule on how the Ombudsperson 
mechanism, as amended by UNSCR 1989, comports with requirements of an effective review 
procedure.  Although Kadi was delisted by the 1267 Committee on 5 October 2012, the court 
decision will likely have important precedential significance. The other prominent case 
concerning Youssef Nada, decided 12 September 2012 by the European Court of Human Rights, 
likewise focused on national implementation of UN sanctions, rather than challenging sanctions 
at the UN level, and did not evaluate the current Ombudsperson process.     
 
In 2009, we challenged the characterization of these due process issues as solely a “European 
problem;” rather, the predominant number of European cases signaled a broader problem for 
sanctions at the UN level. In the meantime, a new challenge has developed that has a distinctive 
European dimension.  A review of current sanctions litigation reveals a growing number of 
challenges and annulments of EU autonomous sanctions by European courts. It appears that the 
new frontier in sanctions litigation is indeed a European phenomenon.  The current trend 
portends growing controversy and potential harm to the instrument of targeted sanctions should 
policy reforms not occur. The symbolic significance of persistent litigation should not be 
underestimated; public opinion may not differentiate between collective UN sanctions and EU 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
5'The “like minded states” include Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. '
6 In March 2012, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled against Kadi’s challenge to his 
listing in the US. 
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autonomous sanctions and can damage the instrument of targeted sanctions overall, as well as the 
reputation of the EU and UN Security Council. 
 
Just as there has been dissatisfaction among human rights advocates with the current system, 
many national policy-makers are frustrated with what is perceived to be a preoccupation with 
due process concerns.  Without diminishing the importance of advancing fair and clear 
procedures, the extraordinary resources dedicated to the 1822 and subsequent reviews of the list 
and procedural changes to enhance due process, has distracted attention of the 1267 Committee 
from the core preventive aspects of the counterterrorism sanctions, and sanctions reform in 
general. Concerted initiatives to strengthen implementation by Member States, build national 
capacity to counter terrorism, and adapt policies to the ever-changing threat from Al-Qaida have 
been limited.  A disproportionate share of attention focuses on procedural issues at the expense 
of enhancing the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures and developing new approaches to 
address the Al-Qaida threat.   
 
The purpose of this report is to provide an update of the significant due process reforms within 
the 1267 committee over the past three years, in particular by assessing the operational 
experience of the Office of the Ombudsperson; survey the legal landscape and current trends; 
and discuss opportunities for the Security Council’s consideration of the renewal of the 1267 
Committee and the Office of the Ombudsperson as it continues efforts to improve and strengthen 
UN sanctions against Al-Qaida.'
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SECTION ONE: UPDATE OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2009  
 
The three years since the last Watson Report has witnessed significant due process reforms.  For 
a decade, the 1267 regime has continuously demonstrated impressive procedural innovation (see 
Table I), yet it is the creation and enhancement of the Ombudsperson mechanism that represents 
“the most innovative and daring” of reforms adopted by the UN Security Council.7  This section 
summarizes the major developments within the UN system to address legal and political 
challenges to targeted sanctions since October 2009.8  
UNSCR 1904 – Establishment of the Ombudsperson Mechanism 
On 17 December 2009, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 1904, instituting reforms to 
streamline the process for listing individuals and entities, calling on Member States to provide as 
much relevant identifying information for listings as possible, and directed the Committee to 
make accessible narrative summaries of reasons for listing.   
 
The most significant reform authorized in UNSCR 1904, however, was the establishment of the 
Office of the Ombudsperson for an initial period of 18 months to assist the Sanctions Committee 
in its consideration of delisting requests.  Appointed by the Secretary-General, the 
Ombudsperson was to be “an eminent individual of high moral character, impartiality and 
integrity with high qualifications and experience in relevant fields, such as legal, human rights, 
counter-terrorism and sanctions.”9   
 
Annex II of the resolution delineated specific functions of the Ombudsperson - to investigate 
delisting requests, gather and compile new information to present to the Sanctions Committee, 
engage in dialogue and questioning of the petitioner, and draft a comprehensive report for the 
Committee based on personal observations, which was to include a summary of the principal 
arguments concerning the delisting request, following the investigation and dialogue. The 
mandate did not ask the Ombudsperson to make recommendations, but rather to review delisting 
requests and to make 'observations' on the case.  Heralded as a “significant step forward in the 
fairness and transparency of the sanctions regime, thus improving its effectiveness and 
legitimacy,” the creation of the Ombudsperson demonstrated willingness by the Security Council 
to modify its procedures to respond to perceived shortcomings in due process. 10   
  
On 3 June 2010, the first Ombudsperson was appointed by the Secretary General — Kimberly 
Prost, a former judge on the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia with more than 20 
years’ experience as a federal prosecutor in Canada.11 A detailed discussion and assessment of 
the Office of the Ombudsperson follows in Section Two. 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
7 1267 Monitoring Team 13th Report, S/AC.37/2012/MT/O.C.234, 31 October 2012, para 10. 
8 A discussion of legal developments since 2009 is the focus of Section Two, and not addressed here. 
9 UNSCR 1904; the full list of responsibilities of the Ombudsperson’s Office is set out in Annex II of the UNSCR 
1904, at:  http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1904(2009) 
10 UN Press release, 17 December 2009, at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/sc9825.doc.htm 
11 Press Conference to Present Ombudsperson of Security Council’s 1267 Committee, 15 July 2010, at:  
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2010/100715_1267.doc.htm. 
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UNSCR 1989 – Enhanced Ombudsperson Mandate 
The renewal of the 1267 Committee mandate in June 2011 resulted in the separation of sanctions 
against Al-Qaida and associated groups from those focused on the Taliban, and a new regime 
targeting violent extremists in Afghanistan was created with UNSCR 1988. Under the 
concurrently adopted UNSCR 1989, the 1267 Committee was renamed (the Security Council 
Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) Concerning Al-Qaida and 
Associated Individuals and Entities) and further changes were adopted to enhance fairness and 
transparency of the sanctions.  A designating state trigger, reversing the consensus requirement 
for delisting decisions in the Committee, provides for automatic removal of names proposed by 
the designating state at any time.12 
 
In part responding to continuing critiques that the Ombudsperson process failed to satisfy legal 
standards guaranteeing listed individuals due process (especially concerning independence and 
providing effective remedy)13, UNSCR 1989 expanded the mandate of the Ombudsperson to 
require that the Ombudsperson make formal recommendations to the Committee whether to 
accept or reject a delisting request.   
 
The most far-reaching reform in 2011, however, strengthened the Ombudsperson 
recommendations by making them final and automatic in 60 days, unless overturned 
unanimously by the Committee or a vote by the Security Council. If the Ombudsperson 
recommends against retaining a listing, then that individual or entity is delisted in 60 days unless 
the Committee decides unanimously to retain it, or the question is referred to the Security 
Council.  The effect of the 1989 reforms reversing the consensus requirement, according to the 
Special Rapporteur, is “to create a strong presumption that the Ombudsperson’s recommendation 
to delist will be honored by the Committee.”14  “Essentially, the Ombudsperson for the 1267 
sanctions regime is now the first and only independent body that the Security Council has given 
its consent to review specific decisions of the Council.”15  Collectively, the reforms adopted in 
UNSCR 1989 represent an unprecedented step by the Security Council to provide fairer and 
clearer procedures when applying sanctions to individuals.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
12 The recommendation to accord privileged status to designating states for delisting requests was proposed to 
address structural constraints with the 1267 committee inhibiting or delaying progress on delisting decisions. See 
Watson Report 2009, pg. 25. 
13 See among others, Security Council Targeted Sanctions, Due Process and the 1267 Ombudsperson, Grant L. 
Willis, University of Leiden, 2010 at: http://works.bepress.com/grant_willis/1/; Ana María Salinas de Frías, Katja L. 
H. Samuel and Nigel D. White (eds.), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2012), chap. 16.  
 
14 Special Rapporteur report 
15 Willis. 
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Table I: Procedural Changes in UNSCR 1267 Regime 
Procedural Changes in UNSCR 1267 Regime 
Date Listing Delisting Procedural 
10/1999 UNSCR 1267 imposes 
financial sanctions on 
Taliban 
  
02/2000   Committee approves 
exemptions on flight ban 
for the Hajj 
12/2000 UNSCR 1333 imposes 
financial sanctions on 
Usama bin Laden and 
associates (including al 
Qaida) 
 UNSCR 1333 appoints 
committee of experts 
01/2001 Committee issues first 
list pursuant to UNSCR 
1267 and 1333 
 Committee approves 
procedures for 
humanitarian aid 
exemptions 
02/2001   Committee approves 
procedures for 
humanitarian aid 
exemptions 
01/2002 UNSCR 1390 expands 
listing of Usama bin 
Laden, Al Qaida, the 
Taliban and other groups 
undertakings or entities 
associated with them 
 UNSCR 1390 introduces 
travel ban and exemptions 
contained therein; 
expansion of financial 
sanctions to cover 
“economic resources” 
08/2002  Committee announces 
delisting procedures 
 
11/2002 Committee issues 
Guidelines 9 Nov 2002 
Committee issues 
guidelines 
 
12/2002   UNSCR 1452 introduces 
exemptions to financial 
sanctions; notification with 
48 hrs. NOP for basic 
expenses; approval process 
for extraordinary expenses 
01/2003 UNSCR 1455 
emphasizes importance 
of identifying 
information 
 UNSCR 1455 requires 
Committee to communicate 
list to MS every three 
months 
04/2003   Committee revises 
Guidelines; includes new 
section on updating lists 
!9'
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01/2004 UNSCR 1526 requires 
MS to include detailed 
identifying information 
and background 
information 
 UNSCR 1526 calls for 
appointment of Analytical 
Support & Sanctions 
Monitoring Team (MT) 
07/2005 UNSCR 1617 requires 
detailed statements of 
case; articulates what 
should be contained 
within them; clarifies 
those subject to targeted 
sanctions 
 UNSCR 1617 requires MS 
to inform target; permits 
release of information 
about listing 
12/2005 Committee revises 
Guidelines, makes 
technical changes to 
listing procedures 
Committee revises 
Guidelines, making 
technical changes to 
delisting procedures 
Committee revises 
Guidelines; includes new 
section on exemptions 
12/2006 UNSCR 1735 elaborates 
substantive content for 
statements of case, 
allows public release of 
that information, and 
creates a procedure to 
improve deficiencies in 
notification 
 UNSCR 1735 extends NOP 
from 48 hours to 3 working 
days 
06/2008 UNSCR 1822 makes 
further improvements to 
notification process, 
calls for a full review of 
all previous 
designations, and makes 
recommendations for 
improving the 
transparency of the 
process, releasing 
information to the 
targets and the public 
about the reasons for 
imposing targeted 
measures 
Reviews process to 
consider whether listings 
remain appropriate, 
annual review of 
individuals reported to 
be deceased; all names 
to be reviewed every 3 
years 
Requires mandatory 
statements of case, 
narrative summaries for all 
listed individuals/entities, 
and notification of listing & 
delisting 
12/2008  Standards and criteria 
for delisting 
promulgated in the 
Guidelines, including for 
deceased persons 
Committee issues extensive 
and detailed new 
guidelines, including 
changes to exemption 
procedures 
12/2009  UNSCR 1904 requires 
annual consideration of 
UNSCR 1904 creates the 
Office of the 
!10'
'
names lacking identifiers 
for potential delisting; 
emphasizes need to 
proactively remove 
deceased individuals; 
pressures Committee 
members that object to 
delisting without 
explanation; creates the 
Office of the 
Ombudsperson to 
facilitate and review 
cases for delisting 
Ombudsperson to facilitate 
and review cases for 
delisting; recognizes 
exemption procedure is in 
need of overhaul 
06/2011  UNSCR 1989 shortens 
interval for review of 
annual circulation of 
names lacking identifiers 
for potential delisting to 
6 months; emphasizes 
need to proactively 
remove defunct entities; 
gives Designating State 
power to decide a 
delisting unless 
overridden by entire 
Committee or Security 
Council; gives 
Ombudsperson power to 
make binding 
recommendation on 
delisting decisions 
unless overridden by 
entire Committee or 
Security Council 
UNSCR 1989 recognizes 
exemption procedure is in 
need of overhaul; allows 
Chairman of the Committee 
to decide frequency of oral 
briefings; gives 
Designating State power to 
decide a delisting unless 
overridden by entire 
Committee or Security 
Council; gives 
Ombudsperson power to 
make binding 
recommendation on 
delisting decisions unless 
overridden by entire 
Committee or Security 
Council 
 
 
Other Procedural improvements – UNSCR 1822 and Subsequent Reviews of List 
 
As noted in the 2009 Watson report, the Security Council has devoted considerable attention to 
ensuring that the 1267 list reflects current threats through regular review of the names on the list.  
Most notably, UNSCR 1822 called for a comprehensive review, commenced in 2008 and concluded 
in July 2010, which examined all 488 names on the list at the time, and began an ongoing annual 
review thereafter to ensure that every designation is reviewed at least every three years (the “triennial 
review”) and that no name remains on the list without review in perpetuity.   Though extremely 
laborious, the 1822 review procedures resulted in significant improvements to the 1267 list: 35 Al-
Qaida names were removed, 26 deceased individuals and defunct organizations were delisted, and 
!11'
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more detailed information concerning those remaining on the list in the form of narrative summaries 
have become available on the website making the regime more transparent.16    
Subsequently, the Committee has undertaken three specialized reviews, as set out in UNSCR 1989. 
Review of reportedly deceased individuals or defunct entities has resulted in 12 delistings and 24 
amendments to the list. In addition, the Committee reviewed 70 entries lacking identifying 
information necessary for effective implementation. The Committee also completed its first round of 
the triennial review, in which 18 names were considered to determine whether continued listing 
remains appropriate.  As of 6 December 2012, 295 names remained on the Al-Qaida Sanctions 
List -- 232 individuals and 63 entities, down from the peak in 2009 of 371 names.17  Since the 
list was created in 2001, the Committee has removed 137 Al-Qaida names, 74 individuals and 63 
entities, and has merged two entries.18  
Like Minded States Initiatives19 
 
Both in May 201120 and November 2012,21 the group of countries known as the “Like Minded 
States” (LMS) presented recommendations to the 1267 Committee to address due process 
concerns.  Acknowledging the significant steps taken by the Security Council to enhance fair and 
clear procedures, especially the creation and strengthening of the Ombudsperson mechanism, the 
LMS suggest additional reforms.  In particular, the LMS recommend strengthening the 
Ombudsperson process through the codification of certain practices, the increased transparency 
of the delisting process through the publication of a summary of the Ombudsperson report, the 
extension of the Ombudsperson mandate without limitation, enhanced cooperation of States with 
the Ombudsperson in information gathering, providing the Ombudsperson with adequate 
resources and enlarging the scope of the Ombudsperson’s mandate.  Proposals to introduce time 
limits for all listings (reinforcing the temporary and preventative nature of the sanctions) and to 
extend the Ombudsperson process to other sanctions regimes have also been advanced.   
 
Human Rights Concerns  
On 2 November 2012, Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson presented his report to the General 
Assembly evaluating the Office of the Ombudsperson.22  In reviewing the compatibility of the 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
16 Letter dated 28 September 2010 from the 1267 Chair to the President of the Security Council, S/2010/497 at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N10/549/27/PDF/N1054927.pdf?OpenElement 
17 These numbers are for Al-Qaida listings only; at the peak, the names of more than 500 individuals and entities 
were included on the 1267 list.  
18 13th Report of the Monitoring Team. 
19 The “Like Minded States” includes Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.  
20 Letter submitted to the Security Council by Switzerland and the Like-Minded States in April 2011, at 
http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/22759.pdf.  Also introduced by the representative 
from Costa Rica on May 16, 2011, see http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6536 
21Letter dated 1 November 2012 from the Permanent Representatives of Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden and Switzerland, addressed to the President 
of the Security Council, UN Document A/67/557–S/2012/805 at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2012/805 
22 Special Rapporteur report. See also UN press release GA/SHC/4049 on the SR presentation to the General 
Assembly on 2 November 2012 at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/gashc4049.doc.htm. 
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1267 sanctions regime and Ombudsperson’s mandate with international human right norms, the 
Special Rapporteur found that the Ombudsperson’s mandate fell short of international minimum 
standards of due process: “despite the significant improvements brought about by resolution 
1989 (2011), the mandate of the Ombudsperson still does not meet the structural due process 
requirement of objective independence from the Committee.”23  The Special Rapporteur urged 
reforms, among others, making the decision of the Ombudsperson concerning delisting binding 
(not able to be overruled by the Committee or the Security Council), extending the 
Ombudsperson mandate for no less than 3 years and to include humanitarian exemptions, and 
increasing transparency of the Ombudsperson process. 
Similarly, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has expressed concerns 
about the impact of listing and delisting procedures on the rights of targeted individuals.  In 
December 2010, she noted that “while the procedural improvements established under resolution 
1904 and the recent appointment and ongoing work of the Ombudsperson are positive and 
significant developments, they fail to adequately address the structural, due process-related 
concerns which have prompted these criticisms and challenges.”24   
 
Focal Point Activities 
Since UNSCR 1904 in December 2009, all delisting requests for 1267 Committee have been 
handled by the Ombudsperson, with the Sanction Secretariat’s Focal Point being responsible for 
delisting petitions from all other sanctions committees.  Since the separation of the Al-Qaida 
from the Taliban sanctions in June 2011, those listed under UNSCR 1988 (Taliban) are no longer 
able to utilize the Ombudsperson mechanism but can avail themselves of the Focal Point Process 
for delisting petitions.  During the December 2012 consideration by the Council of the 1267 
Committee renewal, there likely will not be any discussion of or attention to the Focal Point 
mechanism.  The information in Table II, therefore, is provided in the context of future 
considerations to promote fair and clear procedures by extending the Ombudsperson mandate to 
include other sanctions regimes.     
 
As noted in the updated table of Focal Point cases, delisting requests have increased, but not 
significantly. Beyond the previous four sanctions committees from which delisting petitions had 
been received, individuals and entities from the Sudan/Eritrea, Iran and the Taliban lists have 
also utilized the focal point, all of which have been denied. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
23Special Rapporteur report, para 35. 
24 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/16/50, 15 December 2010. 
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Table II: Focal Point Statistics  
 
Focal Point Statistics 
Country – Committee: 
petitioner type 
Total number of 
individuals/entities 
requesting delisting 
through Focal Point 
Of these: 
petitioners 
pending with 
Focal Point25 
Of these: 
petitioners 
delisted 
Of these: 
petitioners 
remaining 
listed 
S and E – 751 and 1907: 
individuals 
1 0 0 1 
AQ and T – 1267: 
individuals1 
18 0 3 13 
AQ and T – 1267: 
entities26 
22 0 17 3 
Iraq – 1518: individuals 3 0 2 1 
Iraq – 1518: entities 1 0 0 1 
Liberia – 1521: 
individuals 
19 0 8 10 
Liberia – 1521: entities 9 0 0 9 
DRC – 1533: individuals 5 0 1 4 
DRC – 1533: entities 4 0 0 4 
Iran – 1737: entities 1 0 0 1 
Taliban – 1988: 
individuals 
2 0 0 2 
Subtotal individuals 48 0 14 31 
Subtotal entities 37 0 17 18 
Total 85 0 31 49 
Table dated 3 December 2012 (Available at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/dfp.shtml) 
 
. 
  
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
25 Some requests were granted by a Committee decision to delist while the focal point process was ongoing. 
26 In June 2011, the Al Qaida and Taliban regime (1267) was split into separate Al Qaida (1989) and Taliban (1988) 
regimes, with Al Qaida delisting requests through the Office of the Ombudsperson and the Taliban regime 
continuing to use the Focal Point.  Therefore, these figures are from cases decided prior to the June 2011 split. 
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SECTION TWO: ASSESSMENT OF THE OMBUDSPERSON MECHANISM 
This section describes the procedures of the Ombudsperson, summarizes results and challenges 
of the Ombudsperson process to date, and discusses the central question concerning how the 
Office of the Ombudsperson delisting procedures comport with the due process principles, 
specifically ensuring that targeted individuals have access to an independent review body 
empowered to grant effective relief. 
 
Ombudsperson Review Procedures27  
There are two distinct stages of the Ombudsperson process once a delisting request is received: 
information gathering and dialogue with the petitioner, after which the case is forwarded to the 
1267 Sanctions Committee for discussion and decision.    
During the information gathering phase (four months with optional 2 month extension), the 
Ombudsperson seeks information from the petitioner, as well as relevant states and UN 
organizations, including their recommendations on whether the petitioner ought to remain on the 
list.  The 1267 Monitoring Team routinely conducts “fact-checks” of the information provided 
by the petitioner.   
The following two-month dialogue phase provides a critical period in which the Ombudsperson 
may engage directly (preferably in face-to-face meetings, to the extent possible) with the 
petitioner.  The interaction affords the petitioner an opportunity to be heard, to address issues and 
answer questions with the goal of ensuring that his or her position is fully explained and 
understood.  The Ombudsperson acts as an intermediary by coordinating inquiries from and 
responses for the petitioner to relevant States, the Committee, and the Monitoring Team, and 
vice versa.  By the end of the dialogue period, the Ombudsperson drafts and circulates her 
comprehensive report to the Committee summarizing the information gathered (including the 
sources of it, subject to confidentiality restrictions), and describes the interaction and activity 
undertaken by the Ombudsperson with respect to the request. This includes a description of any 
interaction with the petitioner, and sets out the principal arguments concerning the delisting 
request, based on an analysis of all the available information and the Ombudsperson’s 
observations.  As a result of the 1989 changes, the Ombudsperson makes a recommendation that 
the individual or entity remains on the list, or that the Committee considers delisting.   
After the Committee has had 15 days to review the Ombudsperson’s report (in all official United 
Nations languages), it is placed on the Committee’s agenda for consideration. The Committee’s 
review, including oral presentation by the Ombudsperson, must be completed no later than 30 
days from the time the committee has received the report.    
Where the Ombudsperson recommends retaining the listing, the individual or entity remains on 
the list; where the Ombudsperson recommends that the Committee consider delisting, the 
individual or entity will be removed from the list in 10 days if there no objection, or within 60 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
27 Considerable information regarding the operations, standards, approaches of the Ombudsperson, and the status of 
cases is available on the Ombudsperson website, at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/ 
!15'
'
days unless the Committee decides by consensus (unanimous vote) that the individual or entity 
should remain subject to the sanctions. Where consensus does not exist, the Committee Chair, on 
request of a Committee Member can refer the question of delisting to the Security Council. The 
Security Council then has a further 60 days to make its decision.   
After a decision has been made, the Ombudsperson informs the petitioner of the decision and the 
reasons behind it, and removes the petitioner from the list, if applicable. 
Standards of Review 
The Security Council did not lay out specific criteria to be met in order for a delisting to occur; 
therefore the Ombudsperson established standards of review in order to ensure a fair and just 
evaluation of each case.28 The basic test each request must undergo is the opposite of the 
requirements for listing:  the Ombudsperson considers how the circumstances of the case have 
changed since the original listing, and recommends delisting of members and/or associates of Al-
Qaida who no longer meet the criteria for listing. 
According to UNSCR 1989, acts and activities indicating association with Al-Qaida include: 
“participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or 
activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of; supplying, 
selling or transferring arms and related material to; and recruiting for; or otherwise supporting 
acts or activities of Al-Qaida or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof.”  In 
addition, any undertaking or entity indirectly associated with Al-Qaida is also eligible for 
designation. 
The guidelines established by the Ombudsperson are based on what are widely considered 
fundamental concepts in legal systems around the world. The Ombudsperson has developed a 
process that emphasizes “whether there is sufficient information to provide a reasonable and 
credible basis for the listing,” according to her office (‘sufficiency, reasonableness, & credibility 
test’). The growing body of comprehensive reports allows for increasing standardization of 
review, while retaining the flexibility needed to address each case as unique. 
 
 
 
 
 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
28 The Security Council has not defined separate criteria which must be met for delisting to occur. While Resolution 
1735, in paragraph 14, sets out factors of a non - exclusive nature, which the Committee “may consider,” in deciding 
on delisting, these cannot be categorized as criteria which must be met for delisting to occur. 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/approach.shtml 
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Chart I: The Ombudsperson Mechanism and Due Process 
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Table III: Office of the Ombudsperson – Status of Delisting Requests 
Office of the Ombudsperson – Status of Delisting Requests 
Case Name Type Decision 
Date 
Delisted/Other 
Decision 
Made 
1 --- Individual Denied 25 August 2011 
2 Safet Ekrem Durguti Individual Delisted 14 June 2011 
3 --- Entity Withdrawn --- 
4 Shafiq Ben Mohamed Ben Mohammed Al Ayadi Individual Delisted 
17 October 
2011 
5 Tarek Ben Al-Bechir Ben Amara Al-Charaabi Individual Delisted 14 June 2011 
6 Abdul Latif Saleh Individual Delisted 19 August 2011 
7 
Mr. Abu Sufian Al-Salamabi 
Muhammed Ahmed Abd Al-Razziq 
(Abousfian Abdelrazik) 
Individual Delisted 30 November 2011 
8 Ahmed Ali Nur Jim’ale and 23 entities 
Individual 
and 
Entities 
Delisted 
6 entities: 28 
December 
2011, 
individual and 
17 entities: 21 
February 2012 
9 Saad Rashed Mohammed Al-Faqih and Movement for Reform in Arabia 
Individual 
and 
Entity 
Delisted 1 July 2012 
10 Ibrahim Abdul Salam Mohamed Boyasseer Individual Delisted 8 May 2012 
11 Mondher ben Mohsen ben Ali al-Baazaoui Individual Delisted 30 March 2012 
12 Kamal ben Mohamed ben Ahmed Darraji Individual Delisted 4 May 2012 
13 Fondation Secours Mondial Entity Amended 17 February 2012 
14 Sa’d Abdullah Hussein Al-Sharif Individual Delisted 27 April 2012 
15 Fethi Ben Al-Rebei Absha Mnasri Individual Delisted 2 May 2012 
16 Mounir Ben Habib al-Taher Jarraya Individual Delisted 2 May 2012 
17 Rachid Fettar Individual Delisted 20 June 2012 
18 Ali Mohamed El Heit Individual Delisted 19 July 2012 
19 Yassin Abdullah Kadi Individual Delisted 5 October 2012 
20 Chabaane ben Mohamed ben Mohamed Individual Delisted 20 June 2012 
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al-Trabelsi 
21 --- Individual --- --- 
22 Ibrahim ben Hedhili ben Mohamed al-Hamami Individual Delisted 
21 November 
2012 
23 --- Individual --- --- 
24 --- Individual --- --- 
25 Abdullahi Hussein Kahie Individual Delisted 26 September 2012 
26 --- Individual --- --- 
27 --- Individual --- --- 
28 --- Individual --- --- 
29 --- Individual --- --- 
30 --- Entity --- --- 
31 --- Individual --- --- 
32 --- Individual --- --- 
33 --- Individual --- --- 
34 --- Individual --- --- 
Subtotal individuals 19 delisted, 1 remains on list, 11 pending 
24 delisted, 1 amended, 1 withdrawn, 1 
pending 
43 delisted, 1 remains on list, 1 
amended, 1 withdrawn, 12 pending 
Subtotal entities 
Total 
Table updated 6 December 2012 (Available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/status.shtml.) 
Results to Date 
 
Table II presents the results of the Office of the Ombudsperson since it was created in 2010: 22 
cases have been completed, 19 individuals and 24 entities have been delisted, one entity has been 
removed as an alias of a listed entity, one delisting request has been refused and one petition has 
been withdrawn.  
  
Under UNSCR 1989 procedures, the Ombudsperson’s recommendation has prevailed in every 
case. No recommendations of the Ombudsperson to delist have been overturned by the 
Committee nor referred to the Security Council, although there have been several contentious 
cases, one of which came close to being overturned.29  The following box provides information 
on the cases for which press reports are available. 
 
 
 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
29 The appeal of the Saudi dissident Saad al-Faqih came close to being overturned (see 
ttp://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/02/us-saudi-dissident-un-idUSBRE8610ST20120702).  Reportedly 12 
members of the Committee supported retaining his listing, but ultimately the issue was not referred to the Security 
Council. 
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Selected Delistings through the Ombudsperson Process 
 
Mr. Abu Sufian Al-Salamabi Muhammed Ahmed Abd Al-Razziq (Abousfian Abdelrazik)30 
The review of Abdelrazik’s case began on January 28, 2011.  Abdelrazik was added to the 
sanctions list in 2006 based on suspicions of association with Al-Qaida.  He was suspected of 
being an Al-Qaida associate due to his wide travels to Muslim conflict zones in the late 1990s 
and his links to several Islamic extremists, including Osama bin Laden recruiter Abu Zubaydah.  
A Montreal resident and Canadian citizen, Abdelrazik was imprisoned and allegedly tortured in 
2003 in his native Sudan while visiting his ailing mother. He remained in Sudan (in prison, under 
house arrest, or squatting in the Canadian Embassy in Khartoum) for six years, prevented from 
returning to Canada until the Federal Court ordered his return in 2009.  Despite surveillance of 
Abdelrazik, Canadian intelligence lacked information warranting his listing, and the 
Ombudsperson recommended that he be delisted, which the Security Council agreed to 30 
November 2011. The review process took ten months, and was Abdelrazik’s second request for 
delisting, with the first denied in 2007. 
Ahmed Ali Jim’ale31 
 
Mr. Jim’ale’s review began 17 March 17 2011.  An accountant and businessman, he was listed 
by the Security Council for close links with bin Laden.  He founded the Barakaat network of 
companies (also accused of financing Al-Qaida and maintaining close ties to Osama bin Laden), 
based in Somalia and the UAE, that acted as a source of funding and money transfers, as well 
managing, investing and distributing funds for Al Qaida.  The decision to delist Jim’ale (and the 
related Barakaat entities) was made on 17 February 2012; the same day, he was added to the 751 
sanctions (Somalia and Eritrea) list for being a financier or Al Shabaab and facilitating payments 
to the group though a hawala fund allowing mobile-to-mobile money transfers sans 
identification.32 
 
 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
30 Paul Koring, “Canadian Abousfian Abdelrazik Taken Off United Nations Terror List,” The Globe and Mail, 6 
September 2012 at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/canadian-abousfian-abdelrazik-taken-off-united-
nations-terror-list/article4179856/; Graeme Hamilton, “Abousfian Abdelrazik is Off UN Watch List, But Still Under 
a Cloud of U.S. Suspicion,” National Post, 1 December 2011, at: 
http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2011/12/01/graeme-hamilton-abdelrazik-is-off-the-uns-watch-list-but-still-
faces-u-s-suspicions-for-alleged-terrorist-ties/; Andrew Chung, “Cleared from Terrorist Blacklist, Abdelrazik 
Furious with Ottawa,” The Toronto Star, 1 December 2011, at: 
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/politics/article/1095648--cleared-from-terrorist-blacklist-abdelrazik-furious-
with-ottawa;  Paul Koring and Ingrid Peritz, “UN Jurist Delivers Abdelrazik Justice Canada Refused,” The Globe 
and Mail, 6 September 2012, at: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/un-jurist-delivers-abdelrazik-
justice-canada-refused/article4179966/ 
31 “Head of Telecommunication Company’s Assets Frozen by UN Security Council,” Garowe Online, 21 February 
2012, at: 
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Head_of_telecommunication_company_s_ass
ets_frozen_by_UN_Security_council.shtml 
32 “Security Council Committee on Somalia and Eritrea Adds One Individual to List of Individuals and Entities,” 
United Nations Security Council, February 17, 2012, at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10545.doc.htm 
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Saad Rashed Mohammed Al-Faqih33 
 
On 1 July 2012, Mr. Faqih, a former professor of medicine in Saudi Arabia who insists he is 
committed to peace, was removed from the 1267 list along with his organization, Movement for 
Reform in Arabia (Mira).  After a short stint in jail for opposition activities, Faqih moved to the 
UK in 1993, where he formed Mira.  After posting Al-Qaida and Iraqi Islamist militant 
statements on its website, the organization became controversial, leading to his listing on 23 
December 2004, along with Mira, for aiding Al-Qaida. As Faqih is an outspoken critic of the 
current Saudi leadership, Riyadh strongly objected to his removal and was supported by eleven 
Security Council members, including the United States. His case was considered seminal, as 
there was clear division on the committee regarding his listing; with four states (UK, Germany, 
South Africa and Guatemala) supporting the Ombudsperson’s recommendation to delist Faqih, 
the Committee was unable to reach the consensus needed to overturn the Ombudsperson’s 
delisting recommendation. 
 
Yassin Abdullah Kadi (formerly listed as Yasin Abdullah Ezzedine Qadi)34 
 
Mr. Kadi’s case is the most-well known due to his numerous legal challenges of his listing in 
European and American courts. The formal review of Kadi’s case began 16 November 2011 but 
his listing dates back to the immediate post-9/11 period.  Kadi is a multimillionaire Saudi 
businessman who was added to the list for suspected association with Osama bin Laden.  Kadi’s 
businesses involved diamonds, real estate, consulting, and chemical and banking companies in 
the Middle East and Asia. He was suspected of funding 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States 
through Muwafaq, a charitable foundation believed to have served as a front for Al-Qaida.  Kadi 
claims to be a philanthropist and that the foundation was closed before attacks. Kadi actively 
pursued litigation to free himself from United States and European Union sanctions and was the 
subject of landmark rulings in international law by the European Court of Justice in 2008 and 
2010, which are under appeal.  The UN Security Council delisted Kadi on 5 October 2012, after 
reviewing his case for 10 1/2 months and following a recommendation to that effect by the 
Ombudsperson. 
 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
33 Louis Charbonneau, “U.N. Confirms Saudi Dissident, His Group Off Al Qaeda List,” Reuters, 2 July 2012, at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/02/us-saudi-dissident-un-idUSBRE8610ST20120702; “Saudi Dissident 
Faqih Removed From UN Sanctions List,” BBC, 3 July 2012, at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
18688045 
34 34 “Saudi Man Dropped From U.N. Al Qaeda Sanctions List,” Chicago Tribune, 5 October 2012, at: 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-10-05/news/sns-rt-us-alqaeda-sanctions-unbre89501k-20121005_1_al-
qaeda-sanctions-list-saudi-dissident-saad-al-faqih-committee-ombudsman; Jeff Gerth and Judith Miller, “A Nation 
Challenged: On the List; Philanthropist, or Fount of Funds for Terrorists?” The New York Times, 13 October 2001, 
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/13/world/a-nation-challenged-on-the-list-philanthropist-or-fount-of-funds-for-
terrorists.html; Samuel Rubenfeld, “UN Removes Saudi Businessman From Al Qaeda Blacklist,” The Wall Street 
Journal, 8 October 2012, at:  http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2012/10/08/un-removes-saudi-businessman-
from-al-qaeda-blacklist/; Sanchita Bhattacharya, “Banking for Terror – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, 12 November 
12, 2012, at: http://www.eurasiareview.com/12112012-bangladesh-banking-for-terror-analysis/; Glenn Simpson, 
“Well Connected, A Saudi Mogul Skirts Sanctions,” The Wall Street Journal, 29 August 2007, at:  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118835025334911761.html; Peter Fromuth, “The European Court of Justice Kadi 
Decision and the Future of UN Counterterrorism Sanctions,” The American Society of International Law, 30 
October 2009, at: http://www.asil.org/insights091030.cfm 
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Challenges and Difficulties 
 
In her fourth report to the Council, the Ombudsperson characterized the current procedure as a 
“robust one with significant protections which enshrine the principles of fairness.”35  While 
significant progress has been made, challenges nonetheless have been encountered as the 
Ombudsperson implements her mandate, primarily related to limitations on her mandate and 
access to confidential information.  
Limitations of Ombudsperson authority and transparency 
 
The fact that the Ombudsperson’s mandate is subject to frequent renewal (authorized for 18 
month, and extended once in UNSCR 1989) contributes to the perception of the mechanism as 
temporary; indefinite or a longer extension of the mandate would convey a greater sense of 
independence and permanency, strengthening the credibility of the process.      
 
There have been ongoing issues regarding the improper application of sanctions - some people 
with names similar to those of listed individuals and entities are being mistakenly affected, and at 
times, restrictions against individuals and entities removed from the 1267 list persist.  The 
Ombudsperson lacks a specific mandate to respond to requests for help in such situations.   
Likewise, the Ombudsperson is not authorized to provide assistance to petitioners seeking 
humanitarian exemptions.  Currently only Member States may submit such requests to the 
Committee, but may be either unwilling or unable to do so.  The need for exemptions (travel) for 
petitioners to meet with the Ombudsperson during the dialogue phase also argues in favor of the 
Ombudsperson being able to submit exemptions to the Committee. The Ombudsperson also 
faces the difficult and time-consuming task of seeking the consent of designating states to 
disclose their identity to the petitioner and in the comprehensive report. 
The Ombudsperson is also constrained in the information she is permitted to relay to the 
petitioner in cases considered through her office or make available at the conclusion of the case.  
There is no basis in the mandate for updating petitioners and relevant states once the case reaches 
the Committee, or for notifying petitioners of delistings conducted independently of the 
Ombudsperson mechanism.  The inability of the Ombudsperson to communicate with the 
petitioner regarding recommendations made and next steps unnecessarily impairs the 
transparency of Ombudsperson process, detracting from credibility and fairness.   
Similarly, there is little transparency of the committee’s reasoning behind its decisions, even 
though to date, the committee has ratified the Ombudsperson decisions.  The Ombudsperson has 
emphasized in her reports the importance of the Committee providing reasons for decisions 
taken.  
Access to information  
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
35 Fourth Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson, S/2012/590, 30 July 2012, at: 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/reports.shtml.  
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One of the most significant challenges faced by the Ombudsperson is access to classified or 
confidential information.  This is a major issue since a thorough analysis of all available 
information is critical for due process; restricted access to detailed and specific information calls 
into question the effectiveness of the mechanism.  Overall, Member States cooperation with the 
Ombudsperson has been good, but some States have failed to respond in a timely manner, or at 
all, to requests from the Ombudsperson for relevant information relating to a delisting petition.36 
To facilitate the sharing of vital information, the Ombudsperson has formal arrangements with 
11 states on the sharing of classified and confidential information essential for fully 
understanding the case of each petitioner.37   
Administrative and Resource Issues 
The Ombudsperson has experienced problems in ensuring the full and timely translation of her 
reports.  The word limit on translations applicable to parliamentary documents in the UN system 
has been applied to Ombudsperson reports.  This restriction inhibits the comprehensive review 
by the committee of all relevant facts, as well as infringes on the effectiveness and independence 
of the Ombudsperson.   
As the Ombudsperson’s caseload has grown, the General Assembly has provided additional 
resources through the establishment of two positions for the Office of the Ombudsman.  Funding 
for the translation of materials for or from petitioners remains a problem, as is the need for 
interpretation services during the dialogue period for face-to-face interviews.  It is essential for 
the fairness of the mechanism that the Ombudsperson is able to communicate with the petitioner 
in a language they understand. Secure funding for translation/interpretation services would 
address this shortcoming that negatively affects the fairness and efficacy of the Ombudsperson 
process. 
Assessment  
 
The creation and enhancement of the Office of the Ombudsperson has been welcomed by 
Member States and the human rights community alike as important progress in making UN 
sanctions more fair and clear, but questions continue as to how the Ombudsperson process 
comports to due process requirements. 
 
In June 2006, Secretary General Annan conveyed to the Security Council an informal paper 
which enumerated basic elements for fair and clear procedures. Persons against whom measures 
have been taken by the Security Council have:  
 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
36 The Ombudsperson has noted, however, that the procedural changes contained in UNSCR 1989 have increased 
the incentive for States to respond in depth and in a timely manner.'
37 Arrangements for access to confidential information are in place for Australia, Austria (first formal agreement), 
Belgium, Costa Rica, France, Germany, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Portugal, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom. Also during the reporting period, the US expressed willingness and demonstrated an ability, to share 
confidential information on an ad hoc basis. See http://www.un.org/en/sc/ombudsperson/accessinfo.shtml 
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- the right to be informed of those measures and to know the case against him or her as 
soon as, and to the extent, possible;  
- the right to be heard within a reasonable time by the relevant decision-making body 
(including ability to directly access the body as well as a right to be assisted or 
represented by counsel);  
- the right to review by an effective review mechanism (the effectiveness which depends 
on impartiality, degree of independence, and ability to provide effective remedy).38 
 
With the creation and enhancement of the Office of the Ombudsperson through UNSCRs 1904 
and 1989, the rights of individuals to be informed, have access to, and be heard, appear to have 
been addressed.  Providing effective remedy (requiring independence, impartiality, and an ability 
to grant relief), however, continues to be outstanding issue.  Criticism of the current 
Ombudsperson mechanism thus is focused on two perceived deficits: that the Ombudsperson is 
not sufficiently independent, and that because Ombudsperson’s recommendations are not 
binding on the Committee, the Ombudsperson is not able to grant relief.  
 
There are two aspects of independence: appointment and decision-making. While there is no 
question that the Ombudsperson is independently appointed and has gone to great lengths to 
demonstrate independence of mind and impartiality, her independence relating to decision-
making and the ability to grant relief is contested.   
 
The Special Rapporteur maintains that, “as regards an (objective) appearance of independence, 
the structural flaws remain the same” since the possibility of the Security Council overturning 
the Ombudsperson decision exists, no matter how unlikely or infrequently the power is 
exercised.39  He concluded that even after the 1989 reforms, “the mandate of the Ombudsperson 
still does not meet structural due process requirement of objective independence from the 
Committee.”40  Other legal experts likewise contend that the Ombudsperson lacks the power to 
grant effective remedy and continue to argue for judicial review with binding authority for the 
Ombudsperson over the Committee.41  
 
The Ombudsperson and some experts argue, however, that Ombudsperson’s current mandate 
adequately safeguards the rights of listed persons to a fair, independent, and effective process. If 
we “focus … on the fundamental components of fairness, as opposed to the mechanics by which 
they are delivered, … the Office of the Ombudsperson … can provide the necessary fair and 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
38 See letter dated 15 June 2006 from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council, informal paper 
entitled, “Targeted individual sanctions: fair and clear procedures for listing and delisting”. Proceedings of 5474th 
Meeting, S/PV.5474, New York 22 June 2006. Available online at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N06/400/28/PDF/N0640028.pdf?OpenElement. These elements, based 
upon a report commissioned by the UN Office of the Legal Affairs of Professor Bardo Fassbender), represented  
articulation by UN officials of minimum standards of procedural fairness and due process. 
39 The Special Rapporteur argued that the ‘very existence’ of an executive power to overturn the decision of a quasi-
judicial body vitiates the regime. Special Rapporteur report, para. 32 and 34.  
40 Special Rapporteur report, para 34.   
41 Ibid. para 35; Willis. It should be noted, however, that these critiques largely focus on formal legal criteria, 
usually disregarding the informal authority exercised by the Ombudsperson in providing a fair review process.  
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clear process.”42 As echoed by the 1267 Monitoring Team, “the argument that the 
Ombudsperson’s mandate provides due process guarantees is now a strong one,” and both in law 
and in practice, the Ombudsperson mechanism appears to meet required criteria, “including an 
effective review through the presumption that her recommendations will have the force of 
decisions.”43 Adoption of the reform in UNSCR 1989 reversing the presumption was critical and 
groundbreaking in that an independent reviewer’s recommendation to delist is final unless 
unanimously overturned by 15 countries – a high bar with strong political and legal disincentives 
for exercising veto authority. 
The Ombudsperson further argues that fair process is contextual and does not require structural 
due process in the form of formal judicial review; rather fair process from a principled basis can 
be sufficient since courts have recognized the unique circumstances of overlaying a quasi-
judicial mechanism onto a political process.  Indeed, the Ombudsperson maintains that the 
current mechanism allowing her to consider all information de novo, (especially current 
information, not just that at the time of the listing decision as a court does) and to interact with 
designees face-to-face, offers advantages over judicial review.  Moreover, the strict time limits of 
the Ombudsperson process are superior in terms of rendering a decision in months rather than 
years.    
That said, the current system is not without problems: difficulties continue in ensuring that the 
Ombudsperson has access to relevant information. As noted by the Ombudsperson, “many of the 
challenges faced in this respect relate to the question of classified/confidential material, again 
highlighting the importance of reaching agreements with states on access to such material.”44  
Reflecting the complexity of applying legal standards of a national level to an international 
political body, the critical question remains how the Ombudsperson process comports to due 
process requirements. 
Clearly the Ombudsperson process does not constitute formal judicial review of Security Council 
decisions: there is no requirement to provide evidence to targets (although the Ombudsperson 
provides information to the petitioner), no hearing before definitive decision-makers (although 
the Ombudsperson’s process of dialogue, report and presentation before the committee 
constitutes hearing, and if the committee overturns the recommendation, it must provide 
reasons), and Ombudsperson recommendations are not binding (but the threshold of unanimous 
agreement of all 15 Security Council members is a high threshold).  While the Ombudsperson 
process falls short of formal judicial review, it offers what arguably are equivalent elements that 
go a long way to address due process concerns, in essence, de facto judicial review.  
European courts thus far have not required judicial review of the underlying reasons for listing, 
but rather held that the review should meet standards of ‘effective judicial protection’ (emphasis 
added). The focus on formal judicial review, therefore, could be overcome if ultimately the 
review is independent, impartial and substantive, thereby approximating effective judicial 
protection.  A more flexible interpretation than that offered by the Special Rapporteur provides 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
42 See 12th report of the 1267 Monitoring Team, para 32 citing Ana María Salinas de Frías, Katja L. H. Samuel and 
Nigel D. White (eds.), Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), 
chap. 16. 
43 Ibid. 
44 4th Report of the Ombudsperson  
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leeway for European courts to avoid decisions that strike down implementation of UN targeted 
sanctions.  While imperfect, the current system appears to come “as close as meeting the calls for 
an independent and binding review mechanism as seems possible.”45  
Separate from the question as to whether the Ombudsperson mechanism provides equivalent due 
process is the issue of extending the Ombudsperson’s mandate to other regimes.  At the time the 
Office of the Ombudsperson was created, the Committee chair was asked why the 
Ombudsperson mechanism was limited to the 1267 Committee and not other sanctions regimes.  
Mr. Mayr-Harting responded that the 1267 Committee was “the mother regime of all sanctions 
regimes,” in which the lack of due process was most criticized in court.  If the Office proved 
effective in strengthening due process and the rule of law, it should serve as a model for others in 
the organization.”46  In particular, the Jim’ale case47 (the same day he was delisted from the 1267 
list, he was added to the Somalia sanctions list) raises fundamental issues of fairness and begs 
the question of Al-Qaida-related designees only having access to the Ombudsperson. While the 
issue of extending the Ombudsperson mechanism to other regimes likely will not be formally 
enjoined during the Security Council consideration of the 1267 renewal in 2012, attention to the 
formation of a cross-regime mechanism to prepare for this eventuality should be established.  
 
 
 
 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
45 13th Report of the Monitoring Team. 
46 See UN press release 15 July 2010, at: http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2010/100715_1267.doc.htm 
47 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10545.doc.htm 
!26'
'
SECTION THREE - LITIGATION UPDATE AND TRENDS  
Larissa van den Herik and Armin Cuyvers48 
1. Introduction 
 
Legal challenges continue to affect the 1267/1989 sanctions regime. The most pertinent 
judgement in the litigation landscape since the 2009 Watson report is the 2010 judgement of the 
General Court49 of the EU in the Kadi case.50 This judgement was rendered before the 1989 
amendment of the Ombudsperson’s mandate and the subsequent enhancement of her powers. 
The 2010 Kadi judgement is currently on appeal and the appeal judgement is expected in Spring 
2013. The Kadi appeal judgement presents an opportunity for the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) to offer its obiter dicta views on the office and procedures of the Ombudsperson as lastly 
amended by Resolution 1989. In its judgement, the ECJ may evaluate under which conditions it 
would defer to a UN mechanism, or more concretely to what extent the institution of the 
Ombudsperson in its current form can and does comport with requirements of an effective 
review procedure. Given the grand visibility of this case, such an evaluation may well have de 
facto precedential value. 
 
The 2012 Nada judgement of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)51 and the UK 
House of Lords judgement in the case of Ahmed and others52 present other instances of recent 
1267/1989 litigation which have further exposed some perceived inadequacies of the system.53 
The ECtHR’s Nada judgement offered the first European opportunity for engagement and 
assessment of the upgraded Ombudsperson procedure after Resolution 1989,54 yet the Court did 
not seize the opportunity. Instead, similar to the Kadi approach, it focused on the implementation 
measures and state action rather than that it directly challenged the sanctions system at UN 
level.55 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
48 Larissa van den Herik is Professor of Public International Law and Programme Director, Grotius Centre for 
International Legal Studies, Leiden University, and A. Cuyvers is Assistant Professor in EU law and Constitutional 
Theory at the Europa Institute, Leiden University. 
49 The General Court exists as of 1 December 2009, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It replaces the 
Court of First Instance.'
50 Kadi v. the European Commission, Judgement of the General Court, Case T-85/09, 30 September 2010. '
51 ECtHR, Nada v. Switzerland, Judgement of the Grand Chamber, Appl. No. 10593/08, 12 September 2012.'
52 UK House of Lords, Ahmed and others v. Her Majesty’s Treasury, [2010] UKSC 2, 27 January 2010.'
53 The fact that Nada had been delisted and the sanctions lifted at the time of the judgement, did not deprive Nada of 
his victim status given the restrictions he had suffered while being listed from 2001, or in any event when the 
sanctions were effectively imposed in November 2003, until he was delisted in September-October 2009, Nada 
Judgement, para. 129.'
54 The institution of the Ombudsperson post-dated the case brought before the ECtHR in Nada as the Court pointed 
out in para. 78 of the Judgment, but it preceded the outcome of the Judgment as such and thus allowed the ECtHR to 
offer some obiter dicta views. As indicated by Special Rapporteur Emmerson, the Nada Judgement has implications 
for three of the permanent members of the Security Council and is wider in geographical reach than the ECJ Kadi 
Judgement, Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, 2nd 
annual report by Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson, UN Doc. A/67/396, 26 September 2012, para. 21.'
55 Nada complained that the ban on entering or transiting Switzerland violated in particular his right to liberty, his 
right to family life and the right to an effective remedy. The Court found that, in light of the unique geographical 
situation of the small Italian enclave in Switzerland in which Nada lived, Switzerland should have done more to 
adapt the sanctions regime to Nada’s individual situation, Nada Judgement, para. 196. Other cases have also tended 
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The approach to focus on domestic implementation measures and other state actions is based on 
the premise that states enjoy a certain latitude in implementing the 1267/1989 sanctions regime.56 
The hypothesis that states have indeed such a free choice to decide on implementation methods 
may seem to offer a way out of the constraints for review imposed by Articles 25 and 103 of the 
UN Charter. However, as already noted by the Court of First Instance in the Kadi judgement of 
2005 and again by Judge Malinveri in the concurrent opinion to the Nada case, this may be a 
false premise.57 Ultimately, states are obliged to impose the sanctions on the persons listed by the 
Sanctions Committee, and unlike in the 1373 procedure, they do not enjoy any discretion as to 
the selection of the individuals or the type of sanctions to be imposed. Their discretion remains 
limited to the methods, modalities and procedures of implementation. In this process, states are 
now encouraged by the Kadi and Nada judgements to integrate a certain domestic review.58 
However, as observed by Special Rapporteur Emmerson, national or regional judicial review can 
most likely not serve as an adequate substitute for procedural guarantees at UN level, since the 
implementing state or regional organization cannot effectively review the listing as such, as it 
will often have no access to the evidence underlying the listing.59 
 
Therefore, the crucial question remains under which conditions regional and national courts will 
defer to the UN mechanism. This question is discussed in sub-section 2 with a focus on the Kadi 
case and the findings of the EU courts on this matter. In parallel with specific legal actions 
challenging the implementation of 1267/1989 listings in regional and national courts, a new 
litigation trend is emerging in connection with autonomous EU listings. These autonomous 
listings concern individuals and entities which the EU has added on its own motion while 
implementing UN sanctions as has been done in relation to the Iran and Ivory Coast sanctions, or 
they can involve sanctions regimes that operate without a UN counterpart, such as the EU 
sanctions imposed on Burma, Syria and Belarus. This special EU litigation will be analysed in 
sub-section 3, with some observations on the relevance of these proceedings for UN sanctions 
regimes and their implementation in the EU legal order.  
 
2. Specifying conditions for deferral to the Ombudsperson 
 
The quest to identify the adequate yardstick to evaluate the Ombudsperson as a review 
mechanism is directly linked to the characterization of the sanctions. Political measures generally 
leave the executive with a large measure of discretion which would minimize requirements of 
review, whereas criminal sanctions require more procedural safeguards, including judicial 
review.  
 
The Security Council has always emphasized that the sanctions are not supposed to be penal. In 
Resolution 1989, it reiterated, “that the measures […] are preventative in nature and are not 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' '''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''
to zero in on implementation modalities. Cf. the Federal Court of Canada, Abdelrazik v. Canada (Minister of 
Foreign Affairs), 4 June 2009, [2009] A.C.F. no 656, 2009 FC 580, No. T-727-08, as of para. 55 in which the 
Canadian Federal Court in particular focused on the denial to grant Abdulrazik an emergency passport. The 
Monitoring Team also observed that most national cases do not challenge the Security Council as such, e.g. Ninth 
report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, UN Doc. S/2009/245, 13 May 2009, para. 17.'
56 Kadi I Judgement 2008, para. 298; Nada Judgement, paras. 176 and 180.'
57 Nada Judgement, concurring opinion Judge Malinveri, paras. 2-7.'
58 Kadi I Judgement 2008, para. 299.'
59 2nd annual report by Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson, UN Doc. A/67/396, 26 September 2012, para. 22.'
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reliant upon criminal standards set out under national law.”60 Initially, courts respected the 
qualification of the sanctions as being non-penal which would allow for more discretion as 
regards the level and the nature of review required.61 However, in the 2010 Kadi judgement, the 
General Court called this qualification into question in light of the indeterminate duration of the 
measures imposed.62 
 
The 2010 Kadi Judgement did remain somewhat ambiguous as to the consequences of this 
finding in terms of the nature of review required. It still appeared to leave room for pragmatic 
approaches that do not necessarily call for judicial review at UN level. A central dictum of the 
2010 Kadi Judgement is included in paragraphs 126 and 127. In these paragraphs, the Court 
enunciated that it would not refrain from exercising its jurisdiction “so long as the re-
examination procedure operated by the Sanctions Committee clearly fails to offer guarantees of 
effective judicial protection”. This phrase is reminiscent of the so called So Lange approach.63 At 
face value, it seems to require that a UN review body be of judicial nature. Yet, by way of obiter 
dictum, the Court subsequently held that the creation of the Office of the Ombudsperson did not 
resolve the defect of insufficient guarantees since it could not be regarded as “an independent 
and impartial body responsible for hearing and determining, as regards matters of law and fact, 
actions against individual decisions taken by the Sanctions Committee.”64 This statement would 
perhaps allow for some more discretion as to the precise format of the review body.  
 
The Court rebuked in particular the fact that delisting could only occur by a consensus decision 
of the sanctions committee and it denounced the discretion of states to withhold information and 
evidence from the listed person.65 The implication of this dictum seems to be that the ECJ would 
equate the Ombudsperson with the provision of an effective judicial procedure, if: 
 
• The decision of the Ombudsperson becomes binding on the Sanctions Committee. 
• Sufficient evidence is disclosed to the listed person to ensure that he can defend himself 
effectively and the listed person is informed of the identity of the designating state. 
 
In paragraphs 132-151, the General Court stipulated the conditions for judicial review at EU 
level. This review will have to be undertaken as long as adequate guarantees at UN level remain 
absent, but these conditions do not necessarily apply mutatis mutandis to the Ombudsperson.  
 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
60 UN Doc. S/RES/1989, 17 June 2011, 15th preambular paragraph.'
61 Kadi I Judgement 2005, para. 248, Kadi I Judgement 2008, para. 358.'
62 Kadi II Judgement 2010, para. 150. More recently, Special Rapporteur Emmerson also held that the de facto 
permanent nature of the sanctions gave them the colour of a penal sanction and he characterized the consequences of 
the measures as quasi-penal in nature, UN Doc. A/67/396, 26 September 2012, para. 58.'
63 See already BVerfGE 37, 271 (1974) Solange I; and BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986) Solange II, with further Brunner 
(Maastricht Urteil) BvR 2134/92 and 2159/92 Brunner v. European Union Treaty, judgment of 12 October 1993, 
BVerGE 89, 155 (1993), with English translation in [1994] 1. In this Judgement, the German Constitutional Court 
declared it would not review specific Union acts so long as the ECJ offered fundamental rights protection. In a 
similar vein, Judge Malinveri in para. 23 of his Opinion to the Nada Judgement referred to the ECtHR’s Bosphorus 
case law. In this case, the ECtHR held that state action taken in compliance with obligations imposed by 
international organizations such as the UN and the EU is justified if these organizations offer equivalent human 
rights protection, ECtHR, Bosphorus v. Ireland, Appl. No. 45036/98, 30 June 2005, para. 155. 
64 Kadi II Judgement 2010, para. 126-127, emphasis added.'
65 Kadi II Judgement 2010, para. 128.'
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3. Legal challenges to/and implications of EU autonomous sanctions  
The most notable development since the 2009 Watson report is the significant increase of 
litigation before the EU Courts that concerns autonomous EU sanctions. The question is what the 
implications are, if any, of this development for UN sanctions regimes and their implementation 
in the EU legal order. 
 
3.1 The system of EU autonomous sanctions 
In addition the implemented UN sanctions regimes, the EU has also created its own regimes. The 
EU autonomous sanctions can be subdivided in sanctions aimed directly against individuals 
suspected of (supporting) terrorism and sanctions aimed against states yet including individuals 
closely linked to the state.66 
 
3.1.1 EU Autonomous anti-terrorist sanctions against individuals 
 
The EU autonomous anti-terrorist sanctions are effectively intended to comply with the 
obligations of the EU Member States under UN resolution 1373 (2001). Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP67 lays down a general framework for EU sanctions against persons, groups and 
entities involved in terrorist acts. This Common Position has been further implemented and 
developed via Council Regulation 2580/2001.68 Together these instruments create a system to 
sanction individuals, groups and entities suspected of terrorist act, amongst other means by 
freezing their funds and imposing travel bans.   
 
In contrast to the 1267 regime, it is the EU Council of Ministers, acting on its own initiative, and 
therefore autonomously, that determines which individuals are to be listed. The procedure for 
such autonomous listings is as follows.69 First a ‘competent authority’ in a Member State must 
have taken a decision concerning the individuals or entities to be listed. This decision must 
concern either the instigation of investigations or prosecution for a terrorist act, an attempt to 
perpetrate, participate in or facilitate such an act based on serious and credible evidence or clues, 
or condemnation for such deeds. Listing, therefore, does not require a conviction, but is possible 
as soon as one competent authority finds there are at least sufficient grounds to instigate an 
investigation.70 ‘Competent authorities’ are either judicial authorities, or, where judicial 
authorities have no competence in the area covered, an equivalent competent authority in that 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
66 As discussed further below, due to the recent judgment in case C-310/10 Parliament v. Council, sanctions under 
art. 215 TFEU, which primarily provides the basis for sanctions against third countries and individuals, may also 
concern the fight against terrorism. Nevertheless it is still useful to subdivide all the existing sanction regimes in this 
manner. '
67 Common Position 2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (OJ L 344, 
28.12.2001, p. 93), as amended by: Common Position 2009/468/CFSP (OJ L 151, 16.6.2009, p. 45), Council 
Decision 2011/701/CFSP (OJ L 277, 22.10.2011, p. 18), Notice that concerns the listed persons, groups and entities 
(OJ C 186, 26.6.2012, p. 1).'
68 Council Regulation (EC) 2580/2001 of 27 December 2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain 
persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism (OJ L 344, 28.12.2001, p. 70).'
69 See article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and art. 2(3) of Regulation 2580/2001.'
70 The listing is thus more closely linked to criminal processes than the 1267/1989 listing process. The Guidelines of 
the 1989 Committee of 30 November 2011 explicitly mention in para. 6 (d) that, “a criminal charge or conviction is 
not a prerequisite for listing as the sanctions are intended to be preventive in nature.”'
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area.71 Second, on the basis of the decision by a competent authority a Member State must then 
suggest listing at the EU level in the Council of Ministers. In practice this suggestion is dealt 
with first by Council working party CP 931 WP. This working group then has a maximum of two 
weeks to examine the listing and make a recommendation to the Council.72 Virtually always this 
recommendation follows the suggestion of the Member State to list.73 Subsequently the Council, 
by unanimity, formally places an individual or entity on the EU list. Listings are reviewed every 
six months, yet delisting also requires unanimity. As a result each Member State can prevent a 
delisting, including the Member State that requested the listing in the first place. Listed 
individuals can challenge their listing before the General Court. 
 
3.1.2 Autonomous EU sanctions against states and (affiliated) individuals  
 
In addition to the anti-terrorist sanctions regime, the EU also has a practice of imposing sanctions 
on third states. Where it decides to do so, these sanctions may be targeted at individuals where 
this contributes to the objectives of the sanctions against the state or regime targeted. With the 
introduction of art. 215 TFEU in Lisbon, it is no longer required that these individuals are 
directly connected to the targeted state.74 
 
Currently 25 sanction regimes are in place against third states and affiliated individuals.75 These 
sanctions may complement UN sanctions or rather exist in the absence of collective UN 
sanctions. They concern Afghanistan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,  Burma (Myanmar), 
China, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Republic of Guinea 
(Conakry), Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Lebanon, 
Liberia, Libya, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, 
and Zimbabwe. Each of these regimes has its own tailored listing criteria. 
 
The individuals targeted by these sanctions can challenge their listings before the European 
Courts. This option is increasingly used, and often with success: annulment actions against 
autonomous sanctions have seen an enormous rise in number. This new litigation trend is rather 
successful and a substantial number of listings have effectively been annulled. This trend may 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
71 See also C. Eckes and J. Mendes, ‘The Right to be Heard in Composite Administrative Procedures: Lost in 
between Protection?’, 36 European Law Review 2011, pages 651-670 for examples where these are not judicial 
authorities.'
72 Council document 10826/07 on the fight against the financing of terrorism, including annex I and II. '
73 Also note that though the working group can examine the grounds for the listing, it may not substitutes its own 
assessment for that of the competent authority. Under the principle of loyal cooperation the Council is bound, to a 
certain extent, to this national finding. See explicitly the ECJ in OMPI II, Case No. T-256/07, para. 133 and 147.'
74 Before the Treaty of Lisbon the legal basis for such sanctions, art. 301 TEC, did not refer to individuals. 
Nevertheless the ECJ had accepted the inclusion of sanctions against individuals who were affiliated sufficiently 
closely and directly with the targeted state. The Lisbon Treaty has now clarified and extended the competences of 
the Union in this regard by providing an explicit competence for sanctions targeted at individuals in the context of 
state sanctions, without demanding a sufficiently close link, in art. 215 TFEU. On this general scope also see the 
recent judgment by the ECJ in Case C130/10 European Parliament v. Council nyr. For the criteria applying t 
measures under the old art. 301 TEC see Case C-376/10 P, Pye Phyo Tay Za v Council, 13 March 2012, nyr.'
75 NB: this includes the sanctions against China only based on a Declaration of the European Council, Madrid, 
27.6.1989,whereas the highly elaborate sanctions against, for instance, Iran and Syria are counted as one, even 
though based on several instruments. Several other regimes, furthermore, such as against Moldova are also more 
limited in scope and do not include freezing of funds, whereas others, such as the sanctions against Haiti and the 
former Yugoslavia are related to UN sanctions even though not based on UN measures. '
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undermine the tool of sanctions per se. It may call into question the legitimacy of sanction as a 
policy tool within EU context which may, in turn have negative spill-over effects to the 
implemented UN sanctions.  
 
3.2  An inventory of the legal challenges to autonomous EU sanctions: a new frontier 
 
In terms of numbers, sanctions against third states including individuals have been challenged 
most, much more than the terrorist-related sanctions. On 1 December 2012, 177 cases were 
pending against autonomous EU sanctions against third countries and linked individuals.76 Of 
these 71 concerned sanctions against Iran, 59 the sanctions against Syria, and 24 against Belarus. 
Considering the influx of cases, this number will be outdated quickly, but it does provide an 
indication of the scale of the problem. 
 
As far as autonomous EU terrorist listings are concerned, the General Court (formerly Court of 
First Instance) has so far rejected the request for annulment in three cases.77 Two of these, 
however, were atypical in the sense that in Morabit, the claimant had already been removed from 
the list, and in Kongra-Gel the action was rejected on a point of admissibility.78 In the eight other 
terrorist-listing cases it annulled the listing, although it should be kept in mind that three of these 
concerned the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), whereas Sison and Al-Aqsa 
were each annulled twice.79 The ECJ has so far ruled five times on appeal on autonomous 
terrorist sanctions.80 Interestingly, two cases solely concerned requests for damages which were 
both denied.81 
As for autonomous sanctions against individuals related to third States, the General Court has so 
far given seven judgments. One of these cases concerned the sanctions against Burma,82 two the 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
76 In contrast, at least seven cases were pending against the autonomous terrorist sanctions: Action brought on 1 
September 2010 - Maftah v Commission  (Case T-101/09), Action brought on 1 September 2010 - Elosta v 
Commission (Case T-102/09), Action brought on 23 July 2010 - Yusef v Commission (Case T-306/10), Action 
brought on 6 April 2010 - Ayadi v Commission (Case T-527/09), Action brought on 14 August 2009 - Al-Faqih and 
MIRA v Council and Commission (Case T-322/09), Action brought on 7 January 2010 - Al Saadi v Commission 
(Case T-4/10), Action brought on 15 April 2009 - Abdulrahim v Council and Commission  (Case T-127/09).'
77 Case T-49/07 Fahas v. Council [2010] nyr, Case T-37/07 and T-323/07 El Morabit, [2009] ECR II-131, and Case 
T-253/04 Kongra-Gel [2008] ECR II-46. '
78 For the interesting inroad into primary law that was made to ensure legal protection in he linked case of the PKK 
see A. Cuyvers, Case note to cases T-229/02 and C-229/05P: The PKK and the KNK v. the Council, 45 CMLRev 
(2008) p. 1487. '
79 Case T-228/02 OMPI I, Case T-256/07 OMPI II, case T-284/08 OMPI III,  Case T-229/02 PKK v Council, case 
T-327/03 Al-Aqsa, Case T-348/07 Al-Aqsa II,  Case T-47/03 Sison, Case T-341/07 Sison II. Most recently it also 
annulled a listing related to the situation in Ivory Coast, though applying the framework developed in the terrorist 
cases, see Case T-86/11 Bamba v. Council [2011] nyr.'
80 Case C-266/05 P Judgment 2007-02-01 Sison v Council, Case C-229/05 P Judgment 2007-01-18 PKK and KNK v 
Council, 80 Case C-354/04 P Judgment 2007-02-27 Gestoras Pro Amnistía and Others v Council and case C-355/04 
P Judgment 2007-02-27 Segi and Others v Council. On damages further see most recently T-341/07 Sison v Council 
where the General Court also denied damages because the breach concerned was not found sufficiently serious. Case 
C-550/09 Judgment 2010-06-29 E and F.'
81 Case C-354/04 P Judgment 2007-02-27 Gestoras Pro Amnistía and Others v Council and case C-355/04 P 
Judgment 2007-02-27 Segi and Others v Council. On damages further see most recently T-341/07 Sison v Council 
where the General Court also denied damages because the breach concerned was not found sufficiently serious.'
82 Case T-181/08 , Tay Za v. Council.'
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sanctions against Ivory Coast,83 and four the sanctions against Iran.84 In five of these cases the 
listings were annulled. Only in the two Bank Melli cases were the listings upheld. These latter 
listings concerned an institution that was quite directly and closely involved with the primary 
entity and actions that the sanctions aimed to target.85 
 
So far the ECJ has ruled three times, on appeal, on the validity of autonomous sanctions and 
linked individuals. In the two Bank Melli cases the ECJ upheld the sanctions, just as the General 
Court had done.86 In the appeal against Tay Za the ECJ annulled the judgment of the General 
Court, but on different reasoning also annulled the listing as the General Court had done.87 The 
ECJ held in this case that it had not been established that Tay Za benefitted directly from the 
economic policies of the leaders of Burma, since he was only a family member from a leading 
business figure and it was not proved that he benefitted himself directly.88 Similar to Advocate-
General Mengozzi, the ECJ held that the causal link between the targeted person and the 
situation that was the primary target of the sanctions was too tenuous and thus lacked a legal 
basis in EU law.89 In other cases, the annulment was based on the finding that the statement of 
reasons underlying the listing was too vague and general.90  
 
Recently, furthermore, the ECJ gave an important judgment in the case C130/10 European 
Parliament v. Council. This case did not concern an annulment action, but rather the legal basis 
for sanctions that served, inter alia, the objective of combating terrorism by sanctioning certain 
individuals linked to a third state. The European Parliament had demanded that this action be 
taken under art. 75 TFEU. This provision provides a specific legal basis for sanctions in the fight 
against terrorism, and incidentally also requires a larger role for the European Parliament. The 
Council, however, had based the sanctions on art. 215 TFEU, which allows for sanctions against 
third states and individuals, and only requires the Council to inform the Parliament. The ECJ 
allowed this use of art. 215 TFEU, and therefore allowed that sanctions under this provision may 
have as their aim to combat terrorism. This rather lenient approach can make it easier to adopt 
such sanctions, and may signal a more general margin of discretion that the ECJ is willing to 
grant the Council in this regard. Whereas the Courts are very strict in their review of individual 
listings in terms of meeting the listing criteria,  statement of reasons and providing sufficient 
evidence that underlies the listing, they respect the Council’s discretion is designing sanctions 
regimes. Therefore, the more concise and clear the listing criteria are, the greater is the chance 
that they withstand legal challenges provided that a certain level of information and evidence 
exists that meets the listing criteria and hence justifies the listing.  
 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
83  Case T-86/11 Bamba v. Council and Case T-316/11 Morokro v. Council.'
84 Case T-390/08  2009-10-14  Bank Melli Iran v. Council, Joined cases T-332/08 and T-246/08 Bank Melli v. 
Council, Joined Cases T-439/10 and T-440/10 Fulmen v. Council and  Case T-509/10 Kala Naft v. Council.'
85 Case T-390/08  2009-10-14  Bank Melli Iran v. Council, Joined cases T-332/08 and T-246/08 Bank Melli v. 
Council.'
86 Case C-380/09 P (Appeal Bank Melli 332/08  T-246/08 ) and Case 548/09 P (Appeal Bank Melli against T-
390/08).'
87 Case C-376/10 P Tay Za v. Council.'
88'Case C-376/10 P TayZa v. Council, para. 71.'
89'Case C-376/10 P Tay Za v. Council, Opinion of Advocate-General Mengozzi, 29 November 2011.'
90'Case T-86/11 Bamba v. Council, para. 51 and Case T-316/11 Morokro v. Council, para. 29.'
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Consequently both actions against autonomous terrorist sanctions and against autonomous state 
sanctions have had a very high rate of success before the EU courts. Out of a total of 22 
challenges 15 have succeeded. Of the 7 that have not, furthermore, 4 concerned the more 
straightforward sanctions against Bank Melli, and two others were rather a-typical. Once this is 
taken into account the success rate of these challenges is compelling. The inadequate listing 
procedure and the inability or unwillingness to provide sufficient information to listed 
individuals, but especially to the Courts is a main cause of these difficulties.  
3.3 Legal protection and the use of confidential information 
 
When discussing the legal protection against autonomous EU sanctions two elements should be 
kept in mind. First, these sanctions are not based on UN measures. As a result there is no UN 
authority that needs to be respected by the EU courts. Consequently there is no formal ‘hierarchy 
obstacle’ to judicial review. Second, and only in relation to the anti-terrorist listing regime, these 
listings are based on a decision from a national competent authority, which means or 
presupposes that those listed have had the benefit of a certain form of legal protection in national 
jurisdictions. Of course this protection may differ per situation, but there is a two-tier procedure91 
and the EU courts are not the sole providers of legal protection for autonomous sanctions, as they 
are in the case of UN sanctions.92 
With these points in mind, the European courts have unequivocally held that in the absence of 
an adequate UN review mechanism, the same effective legal protection must be provided for 
UN-based listings as for autonomous EU listings. 
 
The leading case law on legal protection can be found in the OMPI judgments of the General 
Court, and these indeed require far more than a marginal review.93 Although the OMPI 
framework leaves a wide discretion to the Member States, Commission and Council,94 it remains 
up to the EU courts ‘to review the interpretation made by that institution of the relevant facts.’95 
Such review includes inter alia the question of whether ‘the evidence relied on is factually 
accurate, reliable and consistent’, and whether ‘it is capable of substantiating the conclusions 
drawn from it.’ This thus includes a verification of the facts underlying the listing.96 Yet, ‘when 
conducting such a review, it is not [the Court’s] task to substitute its own assessment of what is 
appropriate for that of the competent Community institution.’97 
In relation to the use of confidential information, the General Court held in the OMPI case that a 
refusal to communicate information to the Court rendered a review impossible, which would 
result in annulment of the implementation measure or the listing. This finding was confirmed in 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
91 Kadi II Judgement 2010, para.185.'
92  Kadi II Judgement 2010, para.135. Also see Case C-550/09 E and F  [2010] (nyr).'
93 Case T-228/02 People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (OMPI) [2006] ECR II-4665, Case T-256/07OMPI II  
[2008] ECR II-3019, Case T-284/08 OMPI III [2008] ECR II-3487, as well as Case T-47/03 Sison [2009] ECR II-
1483, Case T-341/07 Sison II [2009] ECR II-3625, Case T-348/07 Al-Aqsa [2010] nyr. Also see Case T-229/02 PKK 
v Council [2008] ECR II-45, following the appeal in Case C-229/05 P PKK and KNK v. Council [2007] ECR I-439.'
94 In Kadi II Judgement 2010, para. 142, the ECJ restrictively formulated as ‘some latitude’. '
95Kadi II, para. 142, cf further OMPI I, para. 138, OMPI  II, para. 55, and Sison v Council, para. 98.'
96OMPI I, para. 137.'
97Kadi II GC, para. 142-143.'
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the Kadi Judgement of 2010,98 and the Court explicitly held that the case law pertaining to the 
implementation of 1373 sanctions was equally relevant in the context of 1267 sanctions.99 
 
It is thus clear that at the EU level, problems exist regarding the sharing of confidential evidence 
that are similar to those encountered by the Ombudsperson. More concretely, the OMPI case 
highlighted the absence of concrete procedural rules at the European Courts to take proper 
account of confidential information.100 Currently, the EU courts do not have a procedure in place 
which allows the Court to take confidential information into account for the purposes of the 
Judgement without disclosing it to all parties in the proceedings.101 In her opinion to the OMPI 
case, Advocate-General Sharpston has urged the Court to amend its procedures in this respect. In 
addition, she gave some suggestions that were concretely tailored to the specificities of the 1373 
procedure and which therefore took existing national procedures into account as they relate to the 
national decision that is a prerequisite for listing in the 1373 context.102 Even if all specificities 
of this Opinion might therefore not be fully applicable to the implemented UN regimes, the 
overall observation that the Rules of Procedure of the EU courts are inadequate does in fact 
apply across the board. 
 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
 
Overall, in their treatment of challenges to UN implemented sanctions, the European Courts have 
engaged in a balancing exercise that respects fundamental principles of the EU legal order while 
not fully ignoring other institutional arrangements and relationships with other legal orders and 
while taking account of legitimate security interests.  
 
They have set strict standards of judicial review that apply at EU level, but they have left the 
door ajar for slightly different procedures in other legal orders as long as these meet the 
requirement of adequate protection. In essence, the two criteria are that the review of an 
individual listing must be binding on the executive body and that it must be based on a 
verification of underlying facts.  
 
In relation to the binding nature of decisions on the listing authorities, the EU case law may be 
more amenable to respecting the UN system and the special position of the Security Council than 
it seems. In this respect it is important to observe that in their case law on autonomous sanctions, 
the Courts have shown respect for the discretion of political bodies to design sanctions regimes 
in the Parliament v Council case. It is furthermore notable that the two listings in which there 
'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' ''''''''''''''''''''
98 Kadi II Judgement 2010, para. 145.'
99'Kadi II Judgement 2010, para. 138.'
100 Kadi II Judgement paras. 145, 147, cf. OMPI II, para. 158.'
101 Article 67(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court reads: 3. Subject to the provisions of Article 116(2) 
and (6), the General Court shall take into consideration only those documents which have been made available to the 
lawyers and agents of the parties and on which they have been given an opportunity of expressing their views.  
Where it is necessary for the General Court to verify the confidentiality, in respect of one or more parties, of a 
document that may be relevant in order to rule in a case, that document shall not be communicated to the parties at 
the stage of such verification.  
Where a document to which access has been denied by an institution has been produced before the General Court in 
proceedings relating to the legality of that denial, that document shall not be communicated to the other parties.'
102 OMPI II, Opinion Sharpston, paras. 171-221'
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were close links to the regime and activities that were the cause of the sanctions, Bank Melli, 
were upheld. In a similar vein, the European Courts might be amenable to respecting the Security 
Council’s design of sanctions and the listing criteria which could on occasion be drafted with 
such precision as to capture particular individuals directly at the Security Council level.  
 
The current high success rate of EU litigation in the context of autonomous sanctions can be 
explained primarily by inadequate listings that are based on vague and general statements of 
reasons and insufficient evidence. This is a flaw that has already received much attention and 
remedied to a great extent at UN level and may thus be called a European problem which is 
particularly pertinent in the context of European autonomous sanctions. It does however have 
potential to affect the tool of sanctions more generally and therefore it deserves to be examined 
with greater care and attention. 
 
In relation to the confidential nature of evidence underlying certain listings which has been at the 
core of litigation in terrorist-related sanctions regimes, it can be concluded that this problem 
exists equally at the UN level as well as at the EU level. Therefore at both levels further 
amendments need to be made to accommodate this problem.  
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SECTION FOUR – RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN DUE PROCESS AND 
SANCTIONS IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The 2009 Watson report presented three approaches with a range of options within each to 
address the critical challenges the UN system faced at the time.  Due to the severity of the 
situation and the need for bold action to address effectively the legal and political challenges to 
targeted sanctions, we argued: 
 
 It is time to move beyond traditional arguments about Security Council prerogatives.  
 While there are, without question, practical difficulties in establishing any kind of review 
 body, they appear to be far outweighed by the real and current dilemmas Member States 
 face in being able to carry out their obligations under the UN Charter without violating 
 domestic laws.    
 
Because of the significant steps taken by the Security Council to create an effective review 
mechanism at the UN level, the situation in 2012 has changed substantially.  Unprecedented 
action by the Security Council to establish the Office of the Ombudsperson in UNSCR 1904, and 
equally important, to strengthen the mechanism in UNSCR 1989, has addressed critical due 
process concerns. The Ombudsperson mechanism provides essential elements of due process for 
listed individuals – the right to review by an independent and impartial authority, the right to be 
informed of the case against them and to be heard (and respond), and approximates the provision 
of effective remedy – removal from the list.  It has proven to be an effective and successful 
means of protecting individual rights.    
 
Pending legal challenges regarding prior 1267 designations, while greatly diminished in number 
from three years ago, still connote a test of adequacy of the Ombudsperson mechanism; adverse 
court decisions could complicate the ability to impose and implement United Nations’ targeted 
sanctions.  For reasons of credibility and fairness, it is important that the Security Council, as it 
considers extension of the Ombudsperson mandate in 2012, not only renew it, but also continue 
to enhance the mechanism.   
 
The following section presents several approaches the Council should consider as addresses the 
extension of the Ombudsperson’s mandate. These opportunities are not mutually exclusive; 
many or even all could be undertaken simultaneously.  Rather, the threshold question for 
Security Council action at this juncture is whether additional steps to upgrade the Ombudsperson 
process to approximate more closely formal judicial review should be taken, or whether 
enhancements to reinforce the existing mechanism will suffice.   
 
Renew the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsperson 
 
Accord formal judicial review through binding decisions of the Ombudsperson  
 
Among the suggestions for the renewal of the mandate of the Ombudsperson, the Special 
Rapporteur proposed making the determination of the Ombudsperson final and binding.  This 
step would extend the standard of a domestic judicial review, and preclude the possibility that the 
recommendation of the Ombudsperson could be overturned by unanimous vote of the 1267 
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Sanctions Committee or the Security Council.  A variant of this idea would be to make the 
Ombudsperson’s determination final on the sanctions committee, but still allow the possibility 
for the Security Council to overturn the delisting decision.  The committee could unanimously 
refer the matter to Security Council, or the Council could act on own to relist an individual 
directly. Removing the ability of the Security Council to overturn the Ombudsperson’s decisions 
represents the most far-reaching option, ensuring that the process most closely resembles formal 
judicial review as exercised at national levels.     
 
According formal judicial review by making the Ombudsperson’s decision final might be 
optimal from the perspective of the courts (satisfying conditions of independence and effective 
remedy), but it could ultimately prove to be less efficacious than strengthening of the Office of 
the Ombudsperson along the general lines suggested below.  The Council is a special political 
body with unique competences and responsibilities; the UN Charter confers significant discretion 
to the Security Council in carrying out its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.  Targeted sanctions adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, 
counter-terrorism measures in this case, are taken to protect individuals from acts of terrorism.  
While it is imperative that the Council act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations, peremptory norms of international law, and the rule of law, creating an 
independent authority to overrule the Security Council’s designations is not an even-handed 
approach that respects the Council’s unique prerogatives.  The Council took the unprecedented 
and extraordinary step of ceding significant authority to the Ombudsperson under certain 
circumstances, but the provision of due process has to be balanced with the Council’s 
responsibility to maintain international peace and security in a manner that respects both to the 
greatest extent possible.   Just as non-compliance with norms of due process has undermined the 
effectiveness of UN targeted sanctions, an excessively narrow and rigid institutional framework 
of formal judicial review could impair the ability of the 1267 Committee to take effective 
decisions in the collective interest.  Standards of due process that have been developed in 
national contexts should not be applied mechanically to international settings. Instead, they 
should be transposed and adapted to the particularities of the new institutional setting in which 
they are applied. Therefore, when applied to sanctions regimes, the standard of due process 
should be tailored to the unique features of the United Nations system and Security Council 
prerogatives should be taken into account in this transposition process. 
 
While the Office of the Ombudsperson does not have formal, de jure legal authority to delist 
designated individuals or entities, over the past three years, the Office has created a presumption 
of de facto authority. The fact that none of her recommendations has been over-turned by the 
Council is significant, as is the widespread perception among Member States that it would be 
politically difficult and costly to overturn a decision of the Ombudsperson. The reverse veto, 
requiring unanimity to overturn a recommendation of the Ombudsperson, constitutes a high 
threshold and evinces establishment of a new norm. In addition, as described previously, the fact 
that the Ombudsperson can take account of changed situations in the cases of designated 
individuals, meet face-to-face with petitioners, and render decisions in a timely manner, offers 
some advantages over formal legal processes. While the Ombudsperson process falls short of 
formal judicial review as advocated by the Special Rapporteur, it offers what arguably are 
equivalent elements to address due process concerns, in essence, de facto judicial review.   
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In political terms, one of the principal motivations for the creation of a review mechanism at the 
UN level was to respond to ongoing and increasing legal challenges to the implementation of UN 
Security Council resolutions at the national and regional level. Many, but not all, of these 
challenges emanated from within Europe. As indicated in section three of this report, however, 
most of the current and pending litigation is directed against EU autonomous designations 
(where there is no Ombudsperson), not against UN designations. The creation of the Office of 
the Ombudsperson should generally be regarded as a success, but additional procedural reforms 
could strengthen the consideration of due process even further.  
 
Reinforce Ombudsperson mechanism through procedural reforms 
 
While we do not recommend changes to accord formal judicial review to the Office of the 
Ombudsperson, we believe the Ombudsperson mechanism should be strengthened, and the gains 
of the past three years consolidated, through the following actions: 
- Extend the timeframe of the Ombudsperson’s mandate  
Currently, the mandate expires every 18 months; an extended period (from 3 to 5 years or 
indefinitely) would convey greater independence and sense of permanency to the 
mechanism  
 
-  Authorize the Ombudsperson to request humanitarian exemptions on behalf of 
listed individuals 
Humanitarian exemptions to 1267 sanctions currently must be requested by a member 
state, which might lack resources, adequate knowledge, or the will to do so. Further, 
travel exemptions to facilitate dialogue between the Ombudsperson and a petitioner must 
be requested by member states, complicating petitioner interviews 
- Enhance transparency of process by authorizing the Ombudsperson to inform 
petitioners of the status of their cases (including her recommendation), release 
summary of comprehensive reports at the conclusion of the process, and disclose the 
identity of designating states, and publish reports of cases for which listing is 
continued 
More information in the public domain regarding the Ombudsperson process will serve to 
enhance perceptions of fairness and credibility, and demonstrate the rigor of the review 
process in safeguarding petitioner’s rights. Greater transparency will also make it more 
difficult for individual Member States to challenge the decisions of the Ombudsperson in 
Council deliberations. 
- Provide adequate resources to ensure translation of Ombudsperson’s reports (or at 
least essential portions) and facilitate dialogue with petitioner 
Administrative limits on translation of complete reports can impede the committee’s 
consideration of important information.  Further, the Ombudsperson must be able to 
communicate in the dialogue phase in a language understood by the petitioner  
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- Member States, particularly those responsible for most of the designation proposals, 
should provide the Ombudsperson with timely access to relevant information, 
including to the extent possible, confidential and classified information, as 
recommended by the Like-minded States 
The greater degree to which intelligence information is shared with the Ombudsperson, 
the lower the likelihood that she will prematurely recommend a delisting that could 
threaten international peace and security 
Although not specific to the renewal of the Ombudsperson mandate, the Security Council could 
take the additional step of imposing time limits on all designations.  A “sunset” of listings would 
underscore the preventative and temporary nature of 1267 sanctions, and supplement the 
important ongoing triennial review of listed names pursuant to UNSCR 1822 and subsequent 
resolutions.  A three year sunset would further ensure that designations are not open-ended de 
facto permanent (i.e. punitive) measures. 
 
Beyond renewal of the Ombudsperson’s mandate for the 1267 regime is the broader issue of 
whether the Office of the Ombudsperson should be extended to other sanctions committees.    
 
Extend procedural safeguards of the Ombudsperson mechanism to other UN sanctions regimes 
 
Given that the Ombudsperson mechanism has proven largely effective in establishing a 
procedure that de facto satisfies due process concerns, it is important that the Council 
contemplate next steps to address the broader question of fairness, equal application, and the lack 
of due process in other UN sanctions committees.   
 
These questions, as well as inconsistent application of fair and clear procedures, are most evident 
in the Jim’ale case. Following his delisting from the 1267 list on the recommendation of the 
Ombudsperson, he was added to the UNSCR 751/1907 (Somalia and Eritrea list), beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Ombudsperson.  There can be little justification for the fact that the very same 
individual can, for the same actions, be subject to entirely different review mechanisms just 
because the listing was made by a different committee of the Security Council. It is difficult to 
argue why one group has an avenue to redress potentially wrongful listings, while others are 
limited to the focal point.   
 
Recognizing the primary role of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and 
security, there may be need for suspension of the Ombudsperson process in exceptional 
circumstances. For example, drawing on established practices relating to ICC deferrals, the 
Council could maintain the right to suspend temporarily the Ombudsperson’s review during 
sensitive political developments such as peace negotiations over a ceasefire agreement, during 
final negotiations for a comprehensive peace settlement, or while making arrangements for 
political exile within ongoing conflicts.  Normal Ombudsperson review processes could be 
resumed at a later date. 
 
It is important for the Council to begin to consider how best to extend the Ombudsperson system 
to other sanctions regimes. This will not be easy, but the need to reconcile the procedural 
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inconsistencies between sanctions regimes is something that the Security Council will inevitably 
face.  
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 
Substantial progress has been made in reforming the UN system to provide individuals with 
effective judicial protection, but the system not perfect.  Legal cases are likely to persist and new 
challenges may develop. The need to balance the prerogatives of the Council with protection of 
individual rights will continue.  Rather than a problem to be solved, a more appropriate 
perspective may be that these are challenges to be managed.  As such, continued reforms of the 
UN Ombudsperson mechanism to expand the mandate, make it more transparent, and extend it to 
other regimes, are important to the ultimate objective of strengthening the credibility of the 
Security Council and its instruments of targeted sanctions. 
 
As we reflect on more than a decade of procedural innovations to ensure that implementation of 
UN sanctions is more fair and credible, we conclude with the hope that attention will shift from a 
predominant focus on due process issues to a more concerted focus on ways to make sanctions 
more effective.  The fundamental objective of sanctions measures in promoting international 
peace and security will falter if more effective implementation of UN sanctions does not ensue.  
New initiatives to strengthen the implementation and enforcement of sanctions beyond 1267 
measures, as well to enhance the capacity of member states to carry out their obligations, are 
necessary to make UN sanctions more effective tools of collective security. 
 
Finally, we note a disturbing trend in sanctions-related litigation – while the number of 1267-
related challenges has declined significantly, there has been a precipitous rise in EU autonomous 
sanctions being successfully challenged.  Different procedures for UN-based sanctions compared 
to third country sanctions may account for the escalation of European legal challenges, but courts 
routinely striking down EU designations are likely to have a deleterious impact on the perceived 
legitimacy of targeted sanctions more generally.  Deficiencies in the EU’s listings procedures, as 
well as challenges regarding sharing classified information, need to managed, especially as EU 
sanctions against Iran and Syria represent key elements of the international community’s 
coordinated approach to these security threats.  Just as the Security Council took note of and 
responded to legal challenges to UN sanctions, so too does this new challenge of EU litigation 
need to be addressed to ensure the continued credibility of targeted sanctions in promoting 
international peace and security more generally. 
